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The impact of the extension of the sea area of 
Indonesia, the biggest archipelagic state, is the bigger 
task of the Indonesian Navy and the other institutions 
and stake holder of the maritime security. The 
overlapping of the responsibility and authority in the 
maritime security tasks, pushes the Indonesian Navy in 
optimizing its main task. In the scope of the Maritime 
Domain Awareness, the Blue Ocean Strategy might be 
considered in managing an integrated maritime 
security by using Revolution in Navy Affairs in the 
Indonesian sea-power building. 
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Pengembangan luas wilayah laut Indonesia sebagai 
negara kepulauan besar, berdampak terhadap besarnya 
tuntutan tugas yang harus diemban oleh TNI-AL dan 
aparat yang menangani keamanan laut. Tumpah tindih 
wewenang dan tugas mendorong penggunaan 
kekuatan angkatan laut ke arah pengoptimalan tugas 
utamanya. Dalam lingkup maritime domain 
kesadaran, Strategi Laut Biru perlu dipertimbangkan 
untuk penanganan keamanan laut secara terpadu, 
dengan memanfaatkan Revolusi Angkatan Laut dalam   
pembangunan kekuatan laut Indonesia. 
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Introduction  
Indonesia gained over the 
territorial waters of Indonesia and the 
acquisition of sovereign  rights  over 
the EEZ and Continental Shelf as well 
as the acquisition of authority  over the 
Additional Zone was selected for his 
efforts to fight for the interests of the 
United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea is now recognized all 
over the world. With the development 
of the new Law of the Sea, Indonesia 
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acquire sea area of about 3 million 
km2. Means that area of Indonesian 
natural power that used to only 
approximately 2 million km2 (1945) in 
1957 growing to 5 million km2 and 
growing again since 1982 
approximately 8 million km2, of which 
6 million km2 of which is in the ocean. 
Securing such a vast ocean 
areas need Indonesian Navy force and 
officers related to the enforcement of 
the rule of law and the sovereignty of 
the territory is quite large, in line with 
the objectives of national defense. The 
problem of maritime security is not 
just a national issue, but also an 
international issue that over time more 
prominent and affected relations with 
the nation Indonesia or other parties, 
mainly the waters of Indonesia. Based 
on the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982, Indonesia has 
sovereignty waters, but also must 
allow the passage of naval vessels 
and/or other countries civilian. 
Furthermore, in accordance 
with the UNCLOS, 1982, law 
enforcement authorities at sea by the 
Government boat ship is still weak due 
to spread in some instances. 
Maritime security arrangement 
Indonesia needs to be reorganized to 
make it more efficient by establishing 
the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard, 
as a single agency with multi task 
which has the capability of law 
enforcement at sea are qualified, as 
well as strengthen the capacity and the 
position of the Navy which has the 
function of diplomacy, polisional and 
military. 
The important is securing 
economic activities in the marine 
jurisdiction and sovereignty of 
Indonesia's extensive system requires 
a professional, effective and efficient. 
To achieve the required maritime 
strategy which includes a variety of 
fields. 
Some sea security issues are 
quite prominent, and the attention of 
the world community are: (a) the high 
threat of violence, such as hijacking, 
piracy, sabotage, and terror vital 
objects; (b) the threat of navigation, 
such as shortages and theft of 
navigational aids; (c) the threat of 
resources, such as the destruction and 
pollution of the sea and its ecosystem; 
and (d) the threat of the sovereignty 
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and laws, such as illegal fishing, illegal 
immigrants, making illegal treasure, 
exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources illegally, as well as 
smuggling of goods, people and 
weapons. 
For the handling of maritime 
security problem is not only the duty 
and authority of the Indonesian Navy, 
but held together by a coordinated 
manner Bakorkamla (Maritime 
Security Coordinating Board).  
Carvalho et al (2011) says that 
the Maritime Domain Awareness is 
the concern/awareness of the maritime 
sphere, is an  effective understanding 
of anything associated with the 
maritime sphere that can impact the 
security, safety, economy, and 
environment. Maritime Domain 
Awareness requires an integrated 
approach between government, naval 
forces, law enforcement agencies and 
other agencies at all levels. 
In creating the persistence of 
Maritime Domain Awareness requires 
sensor technology portfolio to the 
target search, detection, tracking and 
identification. No single sensor 
technology can achieve this in an 
affordable manner. Maritime Domain 
Awareness involves the ability to 
integrate information from various 
sources in a complex and evolving 
scenario to generate dynamic images, 
comprehensive, and accurate of naval 
operations environment.  
The emphasis on a clean 
operation and a shift to asymmetrical 
warfare have added an additional level 
of complexity and technical 
challenges for the integration of 
automated information and predictive 
assessment of the situation (Frazer, et 
al, 2010). 
Minimum Essential Forces Goals 
The Government of Indonesia 
through the Ministry of Defense has 
devised a program allocating 
approximately 150 billion rupiahs for 
Indonesia's military modernization is 
through the achievement of Minimum 
Essential Force.  
Indonesia's military enhanced 
capabilities through the Minimum 
Essential Force is expected to bring it 
become more professional and reliable 
in performing basic tasks and 
additional tasks assigned to him in 
accordance with Law 34/2004 on 
Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 1 No. 1 (2015) 
16 
 
military Indonesia. In addition, one of 
the main objectives Minimum 
Essential Force is to achieve total 
independence in the defense industry 
in 2024 (Piesse, 2015). 
The achievement of the MEF 
will focus on the development and 
modernization of military force that 
prioritizes the development and 
modernization of the power of the Air 
Force and the Navy, and the 
stabilization of the power of the army. 
Minimum Essential Forces (MEF), 
aims to develop the Indonesian navy 
capable of patrolling the breadth of the 
islands of Indonesia in 2024. The 
Indonesian Military is currently 
hampered by outdated weapons 
systems that make it difficult to 
effectively protect the country's 
territorial waters (Guidance 2008).  
Plans defense capabilities 
aimed at achieving the Minimum 
Essential Forces that “the level of forc 
that can ensure the achievement of the 
strategic defense interests directly, 
with priority given to increase the 
procurement of defense force 
minimum and or replacement of 
weapon systems / equipment that is 
outdated (Presidential  Regulations 
No. 7/2008) , In operational terms, 
there are no immediate plans to 
introduce a significant increase in the 
number of military personnel 
(Indonesia's Ministry of Defence, 
2008), but priority will be given to 
improve the quality of combat 
readiness, mobility, and maintenance 
and repair of general ability navy, 
corps sea, and the air force (Wulan, 
2009). 
In the interest of maintaining 
the safety, security, and defense at sea, 
the Navy Indonesia as the backbone of 
the defense and security at sea still do 
not have sufficient capacity to 
undertake mastery of the sea under 
national jurisdiction. Of the needs of 
approximately 300 combatant ships, 
the Navy had about 130 ships to the 
composition and capabilities were 
deemed inadequate.  
Development of Indonesian 
Navy should become more outward 
looking, which is based on the needs 
of the national sea control to the 
boundaries of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, not only to support the defense 
on the ground. It should also consider 
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the defense strategy that is both 
deterrent and denial. If the enemy can 
be resisted and prevented in the ocean, 
we do not need to fight on land. 
Research Methods  
This research explained using 
a qualitative method which to give 
description about the implementation 
of blue ocean strategies in the 
maritime security. This study 
illustrates the application perspective 
blue ocean strategy as the basic 
framework of maritime security in 
Indonesia. With the orientation 
discussion on four levels in the value 
of innovation 
Result and Discussion 
Revolution in Navy Affairs 
Revolutionary of Military 
Affairs (RMA) is an evolving concept 
with the development of technology 
and information that encourages a 
country to increase its capabilities in 
winning the battle or face future 
threats. RMA refers to the introduction 
and implementation of new thinking 
about strategy and tactics, 
organization and military doctrine, 
force structure and weapons entire 
acquisition (Gongora and von 
Riekhoff, 2000; Gray, 2004; US 
Secretary of Defense, 2003).  
Hundley (Moon and Lee, 
2008) shows, RMA paradigm involves 
a major change in the conduct of 
military operations, which result from 
the combination of several innovations 
in technologies, devices, systems, 
operational concept and military 
doctrine and force structure. In a 
narrow sense, based on major 
innovations in sensor (reconnaissance 
and surveillance), command, control, 
communications, computers and 
intelligence, sniper, and the network, 
assuming the network-centric warfare 
as the core of a future war. 
Based on that idea, the RMA 
can be regarded as a comprehensive 
transformation to improve a country's 
ability to win the battle facing the 
threat of ever-changing and 
multidimensional due to the progress 
of science and technology, particularly 
computer-based technologies, 
communications and information.  
RMA also refers to the 
effectiveness of performance in the 
context of the capability for the battle-
winning capabilities. MEF compliance 
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in relation to the development of 
doctrine and organization to achieve 
the level of capability that can address 
all forms of threats that can jeopardize 
the projected state sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and safety of the 
nation. This is in line with the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
which is an improvement of military 
capabilities in carrying out combat 
operations. 
According Blaker (Hoffman, 
2006) RMA as a supporter of the 
superiority and dominance alleged 
information for American arms. They 
called for a sharp increase in spending 
on the “system of systems” that will 
increase the capacity of the United 
States to use information technology 
and precision weapons. Those with the 
most fully developed plan explicitly 
used cutting ground forces, cutting at 
least two Divisions of the Army and 
the Marine Division as an offset for 
more computers, satellite, sensor 
networks, and precision munitions. 
Several factors have facilitated 
the emergence of RMA in the United 
States and in other places. The first is 
a change in the overall security 
environment after the Cold War and 
globalization. Various types of 
military forces needed to respond 
effectively in the emerging 
international order in which the threat 
of such global terrorist.  
RMA can be viewed as the 
organization's response to changes in 
the security environment (Edwards, 
2000). The second factor is 
technological change and its impact on 
the military field. Performance US 
military in the Gulf War of 1991, air 
strikes in Kosovo and most recently in 
the invasion of Iraq has shown, the 
evolution of weapons technology, 
particularly the revolution in 
information technology, has brought 
major changes in the military 
organization and doctrine (Moon and 
Lee, 2008). 
Finally, in so much as new 
technologies and social arrangements 
and new organizations have formed 
RMA nature, new strategic thinking 
on the use of force, the conception of 
the war and win wars methods have 
been equally important. Precision 
demonstrations, as opposed to mass 
destruction, and the mandate of a 
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minimum of casualties, including 
soldiers have been justified to adopt 
RMA (Moon and Lee, 2008). 
In the American context, the 
transition from military operations to 
build a centralized network to achieve 
effective expected to bring positive 
benefits, such as increased speed of 
command, self-synchronization, 
advanced targeting, tactical greater 
stability and the achievement of 
victory in the new security 
environment. 
Ross (Moon and Lee, 2008) 
assessing the acquisition in the 
military usually occurs through one of 
four sources: the research and 
development of domestic, co- 
production or production through 
transfer of technology, licensed 
production and acquisitions abroad 
directly.  
Given that the RMA involving 
most cutting-edge technology, most 
countries rely on overseas acquisitions 
directly, rather than on research and 
development of domestic or co-
production. Indonesian Navy in using 
the RMA requires a major change in 
doctrine and organization, as well as 
progress in the defense industrial base.  
New strategies and doctrines 
that come from the RMA requires a 
platform of new weapons and defense 
industrial base as appropriate. If the 
weapon and sensor platforms that will 
form the basis of a centralized network 
war is smaller, lighter, faster, and more 
complex, the platform manufacturers 
must build more complex than 
building ships and planes. 
Blue Ocean Strategy 
Given the breadth of the 
territorial sea of the archipelago and 
the tasks to be performed by the 
Indonesian Navy in upholding the 
country's sovereignty at sea, 
maintaining the integrity of the 
homeland, and maintain the safety of 
the nation and the state of the sea, then 
externally, with various countries in 
the Asia Pacific region, particularly in 
Asia southeast, as well as internally 
with all components and institutions 
which have the authority in the sea and 
beaches in the whole of Indonesia, 
must compete to demonstrate the 
capacity of its ability in carrying out a 
duty. 
Anticipating the competition 
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there should be a strategy to support 
the Indonesian Navy with operational 
units built up strength and awakened 
on target Minimum Essential Forces. 
The theory of strategy is a 
multidisciplinary field with competing 
ideas based on the most basic 
assumptions can be compared, 
including disagreements about what 
should be the strategy theory seeks to 
explain. This is confirmed by 
Schendel (Maykish, 2011) that the 
considerable effort over the past 
decade in the field to identify 
paradigms and seek new approaches 
(Maykish, 2011). 
First, the theory of strategy has 
an emphasis on educating practitioners 
on how the theory of the strategy 
involves several changes from concept 
to reality in the military strategy of the 
war plan for organizational 
transformation strategy. Secondly, in 
this definition the emphasis on the 
battlefield for comparison in war 
strategy.  
Drew and Snow (2006) 
introduced the process of national 
security, acknowledged there are five 
levels of classic strategy. 1) The 
purpose of National Security (National 
Security Strategy, foreign policy, etc.); 
2) Grand strategy (or a national policy 
for all the instruments of power); 3) 
Military Strategy; 4) Operational 
Strategy; and 5) Battlefield Strategy. 
Low-level strategy is internally 
consistent with the rest of the strategy 
process as a plan of action which 
organized the effort to achieve a goal. 
Furthermore, the strategy was made by 
different people or groups at different 
levels of authority, with often very 
different perspective of what can or 
should be done. Evolution of five 
levels also support their view of the 
general strategy only expanded by a 
new scale of organization (Drew and 
Snow, 2006).  
For military theory, most 
definitions center on level 3 or 
between levels 2 and according to 
Gray (2010) Strategies is a bridge that 
relates military power for political 
purposes; this is not a military power 
per se or political purposes. With the 
strategic use is made of force and the 
threat of violence for policy purposes. 
Clausewitz (Gray, 2010) that the 
theory of the military in the war is the 
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use of engagements for the object of 
war. 
However, Clausewitz did not 
write during the time scale of a 
tripartite war (strategy, operations and 
tactics). It Winton, Clausewitz (Gray, 
2010) expand the view to display the 
tripartite war bipartite still do to this 
day.  
Furthermore, Gray (2010) 
interpret it in that military strategy 
alignment function to the highest 
levels of government in which the 
object set. While Dolman (2005) states 
that the strategy is a plan to maintain 
excellence consistently. The strategy 
is not about winning, but a moment in 
time for strategists, strategies that 
focus on long beyond setting 
conditions during the battle and 
campaign events. 
Blue Ocean Strategy is an 
alternative strategy that supports the 
Indonesian Navy in the formation, 
development, and use of powers 
associated with the implementation of 
the main tasks or the basic tasks in 
hand. In Kim and Mouborgne (2005), 
military strategy was criticized as 
inherently simple and limited to the 
concept and field competitors.  
This thinking is labeled “Red 
ocean” that means locked receive, 
factors that become the main obstacle 
battlefield is limited and the need to 
defeat the enemy to succeed. On the 
other hand, the creative strategy of 
“blue ocean” create competition 
relevant. The concept is the innovation 
value of the process of removing, 
reducing, adding, and created from 
what is on the standard profiles that 
apply in general, as seen in Figure 1. 
Value Innovation 
 
Figure 1. Value Innovation (Kim dan Mauborgne, 2005) 
Cost 
Value 
Innovation 
Value 
Eliminate  
Reduce  
Increase  
Create  
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In figure 1, the four main 
frameworks in the Blue Ocean 
Strategy, namely Eliminate, Reduce, 
Increase, and Create. In step 
Eliminate, discover what factors may 
be deleted, which is considered 'must' 
in the activities of the organization in 
general.  
In step Reduce, explore the 
factors that which can be improved 
over the standard of organization in 
general. In step Increase, explore what 
factors may be reduced below the 
standard of organization in general. In 
step Create, explore what factors may 
be created which has never been raised 
or carried out in the organization in 
general. Blue Ocean Strategy 
Implementation in the Maritime 
Security Troubleshooting Territory, 
by implementing four major 
frameworks, as follows: 
First step, Eliminate. 
Indonesia requires the Navy to identify 
factors that have long been the scene 
of rivalry that is often taken for 
granted although it did not give the 
value or reduce value to the 
organization. By looking at the time, 
the situation of the red ocean focus on 
the main tasks or the basic tasks Navy 
Indonesia, namely state sovereignty 
and law enforcement in marine waters, 
EEZ and continental shelf. To get 
away from the 'red ocean', the new 
strategy will focus on fulfilling the 
primary function of sovereignty and 
law enforcement in the region within 
the range of tasks Indonesian Navy 
and abolish the functions can be done 
by other agencies involved in 
coordination Bakorkamla (Maritime 
Security Coordinating Board). 
Second Step, Reduce. An 
evaluation step of the operations that 
had been prepared by the Indonesian 
Navy to be able to carry out all the 
tasks handed over to the Indonesian 
Navy. In support to the task force 
Bakorkamla (Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board), reducing 
delivery task forces that can be 
prepared by other agencies, without 
prejudice to the existence of 
Indonesian Navy in coordination 
Bakorkamla (Maritime Security 
Coordinating Board). Reduce any 
excessive spending, with the 
efficiency of delivery of the elements 
of the sea and the air is right and 
appropriate tasks to be assigned.  
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Without reducing the 
effectiveness of the carrying ability of 
the elements of the Indonesian Navy 
under the control of the operation 
(BKO) to Bakorkamla (Maritime 
Security Coordinating Board), 
efficient allocation of budgetary 
support. Without prejudice vigilance 
against possible escalation of conflict 
in the sea border with neighboring 
countries, reducing shipping combat 
forces deployed at the borders with 
other countries, but rather pointed to 
the diplomatic efforts in the next step. 
Third Step, Increase. 
Indonesian Navy efforts to improve 
operational capabilities according 
main tasks or the basic tasks in hand. 
Improve guidance and development of 
Indonesian Navy force refers to the 
target MEF (Minimum Essential 
Forces) as a sea power that is reliable 
and respected. In addition, optimizing 
diplomacy with friendly countries, 
either directly has a maritime border 
with Indonesia, and which have an 
influence on the environmental 
situation in the border conflict around 
the area. 
Fourth step, Creating. An 
attempt by the Navy to demonstrate 
the ability to use sea power as 
demanded in the essential task or core 
functions, namely enforcement of the 
sovereignty and laws in the area of sea 
to the EEZ and the continental shelf, at 
least not lead to strength according 
MEF, it needs the capability to reach 
that should not be physically 
accessible by elements of the ship or 
plane, but with the ability C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Computer, 
Communication, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance), 
with the proliferation ability of Cyber 
War- Revolution in Navy Affair. 
Conclusions  
From the above discussion, it 
can be concluded that in the process of 
development of the defense forces, 
with the goal of MEF in 2024 or 
earlier, handling maritime security 
issues in the region NKRI such a vast, 
requires finesse (expected) capable of 
handling it. One alternative is to apply 
the Blue Ocean Strategy. 
From the perspective of the 
Navy, as part of a major component of 
the defense, around the 
implementation of the tasks that must 
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be carried in handling maritime 
security, maritime security with such a 
broad area, the implementation of the 
Blue Ocean Strategy is a necessity.  
Four   frameworks, eliminate-reduce-
increase-creating, namely: First, 
eliminate things that do not directly or 
less relevant to the task (principal) to 
be carried. Second, Reduce the 
intensity of the tasks and things that 
can be done by other agencies 
concerned and more relevant to the 
goals to be achieved.  
Third, increasing external 
communication with other countries, 
diplomacy in terms of area maritime 
border, and internal communication 
with relevant agencies with maritime 
security, in coordination 
countermeasures marine security 
issues, either through Bakorkamla, as 
well as bilateral and multilateral basis 
with the agencies concerned and 
Fourth, creating a sea power capable 
C4ISR (Command, Control, 
Computer, Communication, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance), and Cyber warfare.  
Recommendation 
Although this research has 
resulted in a conclusion that supports 
efforts to establish maritime security 
through the implementation of blue 
ocean strategy, but the researchers 
realized that not only the four stages of 
the value of innovation to create a 
maritime security. There are still many 
other variables that can be used as 
study materials to achieve maritime 
security in Indonesia such as the 
establishment of a new city strategy 
reinforced the coastal region with a 
fleet of maritime patrol were armed 
sophisticated and integrated 
communication system with the army 
and navy. Future studies need to be 
done so that the conclusions empirical 
studies reflect actual research object. 
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